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Despite the fact that the rest of the country has witnessed
considerable agitation and legislation militating in favor of the
admissibility of business records,' the Louisiana Civil Code con-
tinues to carry the thoroughly outmoded provision that: "The
books of merchants can not be given in evidence in their favor. ' 2
That such a rule is undesirable today would appear obvious; yet
there has been no legislative repeal of this unfortunaLe statutory
injunction. Judicial exceptions have mitigated the harshness of
its mandate, 8 but in a legal system such as ours, where Article 1
of our Civil Code declares that "law is a solemn expression of
legislative will," it would seem clear that legislative change is
desirable.
In a suit on an open account, National Supply Company v.
Baillio,4 defendant, a guarantor for a corporation of which he
was president and principal stockholder, was sued for debts al-
legedly incurred by the corporation in favor of plaintiff com-
pany. To prove the debt, plaintiff quite naturally sought to
introduce its books. In light of the circumstances of the case, the
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Faculty Editor,
Louisiana Law Review.
1. JONES, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 609-20 (4th ed. 1958) ; MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE 596-613 (1954); MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON
LAW 155-61 (1947); MORGAN ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, SOME PROPOSALS
FOR ITS REFORM, C. V (1927) ; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1518-1561 (3d ed. 1940) ;
SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL 892-934 (Fryer, ed.,
1957) ; Morgan, The Law of Evidence 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 561-68 (1946) ;
ALI, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 514 (1942); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule
63(13) (14).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2248 (1870). In this connection, see also id. arts 2249,
2250.
3. See, e.g., Crosby v. Little River Sand and Gravel Development, 212 La. 1,
31 So.2d 226 (1947) ; Shea v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 124
La. 299, 50 So. 166 (1909) ; Kolman v. His Creditors, 39 La. Ann. 1089, 3 So.
382 (1887) ; Flower v. Downs, 6 La. Ann. 538 (1851) ; Martinstein v. His Credi-
tors, 8 Rob. 6 (La. 1844) ; Oliver v. Andrus, 17 So.2d 748 (La. App. 1944)
Royal Products, Inc. v. Johnson, 191 So. 329 (La. App. 1939).
4. 234 La. 257, 99 So.2d 103 (1958).
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provisions of Article 2277,5 and some prior jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court affirmed the action of the trial court in over-
ruling the objection to the admissibility of the records. Neither
in the appellate briefs of counsel nor in the decision of the court
was any mention made of Article 2248. In the opinion of this
writer our system of evidence should permit the introduction of
business records under the circumstances presented in the in-
stant case, but it seems clear that this is an area where legisla-
tive clarification is needed.
Reported Testimony
Section 12 of Article XIII of the Articles of Incorporation of
the Louisiana State Bar Association, which governs in disbar-
ment proceedings, 6 provides in part:
"Section 12. Member convicted of felony. Whenever any
member of the bar shall be convicted of a felony and such
conviction shall be final, the Committee [on Professional
Ethics and Grievances] may present to the Supreme Court a
certified or exemplified copy of the judgment of such con-
viction, and thereupon the court may, without further evi-
dence, if in its opinion the case warrants such action, enter
an order striking the name of the person so convicted from
the roll of attorneys and cancelling his license to practice
law in the State of Louisiana."
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Cawthorn7 defendant
had been convicted of a felony in federal court, and the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court had stated that the Commissioner ap-
pointed by the Supreme Court to take testimony in the disbar-
ment case "could, if he so deemed necessary, examine the record
of the criminal case in which defendant was convicted, not for
the purpose of construing the testimony of any of the witnesses
but merely for the purpose of comparing the testimony in the
record with that of the witnesses who may testify before him
5. "All agreements relative to movable property, and all contracts for the
payment of money, where the value does not exceed five hundred dollars, which
are not reduced to writing, may be proved by any other competent evidence; such
contracts or agreements, above five hundred dollars in value, must be proved at
least by one credible witness, and other corroborating circumstances."
6. Rule XVII of the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
(Adopted October 4, 1951, to be effective January 1, 1952) provides that: "All
matters touching upon the discipline and disbarment of members of the bar shall
be governed by Article XIII of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana
State Bar Association adopted as the rules of this Court on March 12th, 1941."
7. 223 La. 884, 67 So.2d 165 (1953).
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and of properly weighing and giving effect to their testimony
as he hears it." s
In a disbarment case decided during the past term, Louisiana
State Bar Association v. Sackett,9 defendant had been convicted
of a misdemeanor relative to the corrupt influencing of the com-
plainant in a pending case. Over the objection of the defendant,
the record in the criminal case was admitted in evidence before
the Commissioner appointed by the court to take testimony.
The Supreme Court held that no error had been committed by
the Commissioner in this regard, stating: "it was not admitted
as a Prima Facie case as Respondent was not convicted of a
felony. It was not admitted as a proof of guilt of his misconduct.
The record in the Criminal District Court was admitted by au-
thority of the case of Louisiana State Bar Association v. Caw-
thorn, 223 La. 884, 67 So.2d 165. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has a right to examine any record in any Court of State
under its supervisory jurisdiction, and this is particularly true
where an officer of the Court is involved. The Court and Com-
missioner have the right to compare the testimony in the record
with the testimony of the witnesses in the disbarment proceed-
ing."lo
Admissions and Confessions
Is a litigant bound by allegations made by him in pleadings
in prior suits? Article 2291 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides
that a "judicial confession," which is defined as "the declaration
which the party, or his special attorney in fact, makes in a
judicial proceeding," "amounts to full proof against him who
has made it" and "can not be revoked, unless it be proved to have
been made through an error in fact," and "can not be revoked on
a pretense of an error in law." It was stated in Sanderson v.
Frost" that in the early decisions there was much controversy
about the meaning of the article, but that since the decision in
Farley v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 2 there has been no dif-
ficulty relative to its interpretation. In a case decided during
8. Id. at 896, 67 So.2d at 169,
9. 234 La. 762, 101 So.2d 661 (1958).
10. Id. at 770-771, 101 So.2d at 663-64. For a discussion of the reported testi-
mony problem present in a prior ruling by the court in the Sackett, case, see The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term -Evidence, 18
LOuiSIANA LAW REVIEW 139, 146-47 (1958).
11. 198 La. 295, 307, 3 So.2d 626, 630 (1941).
12. 133 La. 497, 542-43, 63 So. 122, 137 (1913).
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the past term,18 it was contended by the plaintiff that the de-
fendant was bound by statements made by her in prior judicial
proceedings. Relying on a number of prior cases, including the
Sanderson decision, the court rejected this contention, stating:
"An earlier judicial admission does not in a subsequent proceed-
ing bind the person making same, nor does it estop him from
denying the correctness thereof, unless the other party claiming
the benefit of a judicial estoppel resulting therefrom has been
deceived by such judicial confession and has relied or acted
thereon to his prejudice.' 4 Although the allegations in prior
cases do not bind the party, they are of course admissible as
admissions against him.' 5 He may attempt, however, to explain
them away, as was successfully done in the instant case.
In State v. Faciane6 it was contended that the lower court
committed error in permitting the introduction over objection
of certain statements made by co-defendants after the termina-
tion of the conspiracy and out of the presence of the objecting
defendants. It was argued that the statements in question were
self-serving in nature from the standpoint of the defendants
who made them (against whom they were ostensibly offered as
admissions), that the statements were intended by the makers
to be exculpatory as to themselves and inculpatory as to the
others. The Supreme Court found that there was no error in
the introduction of the statements, and that although some por-
tions of the statements were exculpatory in nature, others con-
tained inculpatory facts and were therefore admissible against
the makers as admissions as substantive evidence of guilt. The
court pointed out that the lower court had promptly and prop-
erty instructed the jury that the statements should be disre-
garded as to the others. Although the writer does not differ
with the court in its application of the pertinent evidentiary
rules, nevertheless it may be appropriate to state that problems
such as the instant ones point up the difficulties inherent in try-
ing multiple defendants. It is well recognized that frequently
instructions such as those given in the instant case are not fully
heeded by the jury. And yet, in cases such as this one, the failure
of the jury to comply with the court's instructions might result
in great injustice.
13. Succession of Turner, 235 La. 206, 103 So.2d 91 (1958).
14. 103 So.2d at 93.
15. See Farley v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 133 La. 497, 541-42, 63 So. 122,
137 (1913).
16. 233 La. 1028, 99 So.2d 333 (1958).
434. [Vol. XIX:
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Both State v. Domino17 and State v. Smith 8 concerned in part
the free and voluntary requirement as to the admissibility of
confessions or admissions involving the existence of criminal.
intent or inculpatory facts. 9 Both cases emphasized the reliance
that will be given by the appellate court to the views of the trial
judge.
Res Gestae
In State v. Domino20 defendant had been charged with op-
erating "a race horse betting book at a place other than within
the track or other enclosure where said horse races took place," 21
in violation of R.S. 14:90. On appeal from his conviction, he
contended that error had been committed in admitting over
timely objection testimony by a police officer relative to certain
telephone calls received by him at the scene of the arrest.
The court followed its earlier decision in State v. DiVinenti22
and held that, although hearsay, the testimony was admissible,
for it referred to matter constituting "part of the res gestae." 28
BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PERSUASION
New Orleans v. Levy 24 was an injunction action brought by
the city to compel the removal of a "permanent plastic covering
or roof" which allegedly violated certain ordinances. Defendants
contended that they were being discriminated against and
brought in evidence indicating that there were a great many
other non-conforming conditions as to which no injunctions had
been sought. To this the city replied that the defendants had
failed to show that these other conditions had occurred subse-
quent to the enactment of the ordinances. In this connection the
court stated: "It appears that the defendants made out a prima
facie case of discrimination when they proved conclusively the
17. 234 La. 950, 102 So.2d 227 (1958).
18. 234 La. 19, 99 So.2d 8 (1958).
19. See LA. CODE OF CRIM. Paoc. art. 454 (1928). For a discussion of the
free and voluntary requirement as applied to the admissibility of admissions in-
volving the existence of criminal intent or inculpatory facts, see The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1955-1956 Term - Evidence, 17 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 421, 424-25 (1957).
20. 234 La. 950, 102 So.2d 227 (1958).
21. Id. at 954, 102 So.2d at 229.
22. 232 La. 13, 93 So.2d 676 (1957).
23. State v. Domino, 234 La. 950, 959, 102 So.2d 227, 230 (1958). For
criticism of the reasoning of the court in this regard, see the discussion by the
writer of the earlier DiVincenti case in 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 139, 144
et seq. (1957).
24. 233 La. 844, 98 So.2d 210 (1957).
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existence of many unrestrained violations. Thereupon, the bur-
den of going forward with the evidence, to explain its apparently
discriminatory conduct, shifted to the city.
'25
In Cooper v. Succession of Coope2 6 the court reaffirmed the
position taken by it in Moss v. Robinson2 7 relative to the burden
of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence on the issue
of consideration for a negotiable instrument.
2
FACT FINDING
Will particular circumstances support a reasonable inference
as to the existence of certain other facts, or will they compel a
different conclusion? The problem can present itself in varying
contexts, and its resolution is often difficult indeed. In Dowling
v. Orleans Parish Democratic Committee and O'Hara29 the court
faced the problem in an election dispute. Plaintiff, a candidate
for the Democratic nomination to the office of district attorney,
contested the action of the Democratic Committee in certifying
his opponent as party nominee. The action of the Democratic
Committee had been predicated upon the conclusion that the
plaintiff's opponent had won the nomination by a majority of
nine votes, but the Supreme Court was unanimous in its conclu-
sion that seventeen of the votes cast and counted were illegal.
In view of this finding, should a new election be ordered? All
members of the court apparently agreed that if it could be ascer-
tained for whom the illegal votes had been cast, then there would
be no need to order another election. The number of illegal votes
would simply be deducted from the numerical total of the candi-
25. Id. at 852, 98 So.2d at 213.
26. 234 La. 832, 101 So.2d 686 (1958).
27. 216 La. 295, 43 So.2d 613 (1949).
28. In this connection the court stated: "With reference to the proof to be
made in a case of this nature the law is fully set forth in Moss v. Robinson, 216
La. 295, 43 So.2d 613, 617. Therein we said: 'The jurisprudence of this state
* * * appears to support the view that when a plaintiff introduces in evidence
the negotiable instrument sued on (legally presumed to have been given for value
received) he is not required in the first instance to produce any further proof of
consideration, notwithstanding that the defendant has specifically pleaded a want
thereof. The defendant, thereupon, has the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence and rebutting the prima facie case (in favor of plaintiff) thus made out.
(Here numerous authorities are cited). But if the defendant offers evidence which
overcomes the prima facie case, that is, casts doubt upon the reality of the con-
sideration, the ultimate burden of proving consideration, by evidence that pre-
ponderates, is on the plaintiff. (Here numerous authorities are cited)'."
For an able comment, with copious citation of authority, discussing the prob-
lem in Louisiana and elsewhere, see The Defenses of Want and Failure of Oon-
sideration in Negotiable Instruments, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 466, 477-483
(1957).
29. 235 La. 62, 102 So.2d 755 (1958).
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date for whom the illegal votes had been cast, and the winner
thus determined. The Justices seemingly all agreed that circum-
stantial evidence could be considered in determining for whom
the illegal votes had been cast. All of them apparently were also
of the opinion that in order to arrive at a decision based upon
circumstantial evidence as to who received the illegal votes the
circumstantial evidence would have to be so strong that it ex-
cluded every other reasonable hypothesis. An area of vigorous
disagreement among the Justices concerned the question of
whether the circumstantial evidence in this case compelled the
conclusion that the seventeen votes had been cast for the party
who had been declared the winner of the primary by the Demo-
cratic Committee, or whether there was some other reasonable
hypothesis. On this issue the court split four to three, the ma-
jority taking the position that the evidence compelled the con-
clusion that the illegal votes had been cast for plaintiff's op-
ponent and that no other reasonable inference was possible.
Since the majority opinion concluded that the plaintiff had re-
ceived a majority of the legal votes cast, he was declared the
party nominee.
How can a court resolve the differences of opinion as to the
proper valuation to be placed upon property? As demonstrated
by the case of Domino v. Domino,"0 which involved an allegation
of lesion beyond moiety, the problem can be very difficult at
times, and can defy scientific determination. The writer knows
of so nice, neat rule of thumb which will cut the Gordian knot.
No Shibboleth seems to suffice; a common sense determination
(such as that made in the instant case) often appears to be the
only answer.
30. 233 La. 1014, 99 So.2d 328 (1958).
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